Paper manager: Matt Farr
Also offered as an optional paper in Part IIB of the Human, Social and Political Sciences Tripos (HSPS) and Part IB of the Philosophy Tripos.
Lectures are held in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science.
| Michaelmas Term | |
|---|---|
| Causality Matt Farr (4) |
Thu 12noon (weeks 1–4) |
| Realism Tim Lewens (4), Hasok Chang (4) |
Fri 11am (weeks 1–8) |
| Inference and Explanation Marta Halina (4) |
Wed 12noon (weeks 5–8) |
| Lent Term | |
|---|---|
| Reductionism Hasok Chang (4) |
Thu 12noon (weeks 1–4) |
| Pragmatism Hasok Chang (4) |
Thu 12noon (weeks 5–8) |
| Probability Matt Farr (4) |
Fri 11am (weeks 5–8) |
| Inference and Explanation (continued) Marta Halina (4) |
Wed 12noon (weeks 5–8) |
This paper considers a series of central questions in the philosophy of science. Topics covered include whether we should believe that our best scientific theories are true, whether there are fundamental laws in science and what kind of things they are, how probabilistic reasoning is used in science and philosophy, what it means to explain something in science, whether and how science progresses through the reduction of various theories to more fundamental ones, and how knowledge relates to actions and practices.
Aims and learning outcomes
- to enable students to acquire a broad understanding of central issues in the philosophy of science and to develop their own views on current problems and debates;
- to develop in students the ability to engage with scientific knowledge from multiple critical perspectives, and to address philosophical issues concerning particular sciences;
- to strengthen students' skills in philosophical analysis, argumentation and communication.
Lectures
Causality
Matt Farr (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)
The idea of causality has been central to scientific thought since ancient science. However, it is surprisingly hard to pin down what causality actually is, with a range of concepts associated with causality abundant across the sciences. This series of lectures looks at the many faces of causality in science, from laws of nature to determinism and indeterminism, the use of symmetry principles and constraints in scientific reasoning, and the use of algorithmic ways of determining causes and effects within statistical data in higher level sciences like medicine and climate science.
Realism
Tim Lewens, Hasok Chang (8 lectures, Michaelmas Term)
Those who admire the achievements of modern science tend to express their admiration along the lines of scientific realism: scientific theories could only be so successful if they give us a true account of nature. In this course we will subject this popular view to close philosophical scrutiny, and explore alternatives such as instrumentalism and constructive empiricism. We will also examine the more recent attempts to make scientific realism more defensible by introducing certain modifications to it, especially structural realism and perspectival realism.
Inference and Explanation
Marta Halina (8 lectures, Michaelmas & Lent Terms)
This course explores the nature of scientific explanation and inference and their central role in our understanding of the natural world. We will critically examine different philosophical accounts of explanation, including the influential covering-law model and various causal approaches. Through readings and discussions, we will investigate what distinguishes a good explanation from a bad one, how explanation contributes to scientific understanding, and how factors such as audience and background knowledge influence explanatory practice. We will then turn to the nature of scientific inference, focusing on issues related to causal inference, analogical reasoning, and inference to the best explanation. This course offers a foundation in key issues in the philosophy of science.
Reductionism
Hasok Chang (4 lectures, Lent Term)
The modern common sense in admiration of science includes not only realism, but reductionism: an inclination to understand something in terms of something more basic and fundamental. The most simplistic yet powerful expression of the reductionist impulse is microreductionism: the view that the nature and behaviour of any entity must be explained in terms of its constituent parts, ultimately elementary particles. The same conception also dictates that all scientific theories are ultimately reducible to theories of fundamental physics. We will subject these popular reductionist views to close philosophical scrutiny, with reference to various specific cases in the physical and the biological sciences.
Pragmatism
Hasok Chang (4 lectures, Lent Term)
The pragmatist tradition offers a valuable alternative perspective to the epistemology and metaphysics of science. While analytic epistemology focuses on an analysis of propositions and their truth-conditions, pragmatism takes a broader view of knowledge as a feature of the practices of life and inquiry. There are also metaphysical consequences of a pragmatist stance, which moves away from essentialism and understands reality as embedded in the activities of the knower. In this course we will explore the implications of pragmatism for the philosophy of science, focusing on the works of the classical pragmatists including Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and Clarence Irving Lewis.
Probability
Matt Farr (4 lectures, Lent Term)
Probability plays a central role across many areas of science, from quantum physics to climate science. Yet it is one of the most puzzling concepts within science. This series of lectures looks at the many roles played by probability in science, including statistics, explanation, causation, and hypothesis confirmation. We will consider how the concept of probability is used in these different areas and look at the competing attempts to offer a coherent philosophical analysis of the concept of probability.
Preliminary reading
- Godfrey-Smith, Peter, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)
- Mitchell, Sandra, Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)
- Psillos, Stathis, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (London: Routledge, 2005)