Part IB timetable

Course manager: Matt Farr

Overview

Lectures in Michaelmas Term are in the Cockcroft Lecture Theatre. 

(Natural Knowledges on Friday 16th October will be held in Seminar Room 2, HPS)

Michaelmas Term

  • Natural Knowledges (History of Science)
    Dániel Margócsy (6⅓), Lauren Kassell (3⅓), Beatrice Bottomley (2⅓)
    Fri 5pm (weeks 1–8), Wed 5pm (weeks 1–4)
  • What Is Science? (Philosophy of Science)
    Tim Lewens (4)
    Mon 5pm (weeks 1–4)
  • Is Social Science an Oxymoron? (Philosophy of Science)
    Anna Alexandrova (4)
    Mon 5pm (weeks 5–8)
  • Space, Time and Reality: The Philosophy of Physics (Philosophy of Science)
    Matt Farr (4)
    Wed 5pm (weeks 5–8)

Lent Term

  • Empires of Knowledge, 1789–1914 (History of Science)
    Mary Brazelton (6)
    Fri 5pm (weeks 1–3), Wed 5pm (weeks 1–3)
  • Philosophy of Biology (Philosophy of Science)
    Tim Lewens (4)
    Mon 5pm (weeks 1–4)
  • Science in Power, 1914–1989 (History of Science)
    Richard Staley (6)
    Fri 5pm (week 4), Wed 5pm (weeks 4–8)
  • Philosophy of Science in Practice (Philosophy of Science)
    Stephen John (4)
    Fri 5pm (weeks 5–8)
  • Philosophy of Environmental and Climate Science (Philosophy of Science)
    Ahmad Elabbar (4)
    Mon 5pm (weeks 5–8)

Easter Term

  • Minds and Machines (Philosophy of Science)
    Tom McClelland (2)
    Fri 5pm (week 1–2)
  • Philosophy of Medicine (Philosophy of Science)
    Harriet Fagerberg (4)
    Mon 5pm (weeks 1–3), Fri 5pm (week 3)
  • Science and Crisis, 1989–present (History of Science)
    Rosanna Dent (3)
    Wed 5pm (week 1–3)
  • Revision Lecture
    Mon 5pm (week 4)

Introduction

The Natural Sciences Tripos Part IB course in History and Philosophy of Science offers a wide-ranging overview of the nature of science and its place in society. The course explores the historical, philosophical and social dimensions of the sciences, the ways in which the sciences are shaped by other aspects of social and economic life, and the roles of scientists in public debate. Examples are drawn from many different disciplines, over a period extending from the Renaissance to the present day: from early astronomy, alchemy and natural philosophy, to the atomic bomb, the discovery of DNA and climate change. We examine questions about how theories are tested and change, and about the nature of causation, laws and scientific explanation. The course also considers whether or not science provides an increasingly accurate account of a largely unobservable world.

HPS Part IB is also available as an option for students taking Part IIA of the Human, Social and Political Sciences Tripos (HSPS) or Part IB of the Psychological and Behavioural Sciences Tripos (PBS). These students choose only one paper: History of Science (HPS1) or Philosophy of Science (HPS2). Natural Sciences Tripos students take both papers.

For help with writing supervision essays, the writing support seminars are recommended.

History of Science

Natural Knowledges

Dániel Margócsy, Lauren Kassell, Beatrice Bottomley (12 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

The history of the sciences asks about the ways in which different groups of people have found out about their world and how they organise this kind of exploration. The power and importance of science, technology and medicine in our own culture helps make this history significant. To understand what this importance means we need to know how it was achieved and how it changes. The way to understand how other people investigate nature is to try to look at their world from their point of view, a view often very different from our own. Until the end of the 18th century, Europeans organised their enquiry as natural philosophy, a means of understanding how God's creation worked and what it meant for humans' purposes and their fate.

The lectures start by treating the moment at the start of the 16th century when the religious unity of Christendom was broken and when new technologies in chemistry and navigation, printing and war, all began to change the world. The course traces the development of natural philosophy and its different forms of organisation as new models of the heavens and the Earth were developed, and as new maps of nature and of the body were drawn. The lectures extend their scope to the end of the 18th century, marked by dramatic industrial, political and disciplinary changes that helped transform the sciences. Much emphasis is placed on the way in which practices, maps, diagrams and instruments represented and helped to change natural knowledge, so the lectures are plentifully illustrated with original pictures and charts.

Introductory reading:

History of Science and Medicine

The lectures that cover the histories of science, technology and medicine from the 18th century to present are organised into three courses in Lent and Easter Terms: Empires of Knowledge, 1789–1914; Science in Power, 1914–1989; Science and Crisis, 1989–present.

Introductory reading:

Empires of Knowledge, 1789–1914

Mary Brazelton (6 lectures, Lent Term)

These lectures consider how European colonialism in the late 18th and 19th centuries fundamentally mediated historical developments in what came to be known as the sciences. Themes running throughout the lectures include the ways in which imperial, industrial and economic power have shaped not only the history of science, but also the ways in which scholars have written that history in the Western world.

Science in Power, 1914–1989

Richard Staley (6 lectures, Lent Term)

These lectures explore the development of the sciences, medicine and technology from World War I to the end of the Cold War, a period characterised by global conflict, industrial transformation and decolonisation. Themes running throughout the lectures include the escalating association of science with the pursuit of power and profit by states and corporations as well as the continuity of violence – and frequent complicity of scientists, medics and other experts in that violence – from colonial to postcolonial contexts. They also consider critiques of science, paying particular attention to how the inclusion of diverse perspectives on the history of the sciences challenges the narratives of progress and modernity that have often been championed by those in power.

Science and Crisis, 1989–present

Rosanna Dent (3 lectures, Easter Term)

These lectures consider the histories of science, technology and medicine in a period characterised by an apparent triumph of capitalist democracies over state communism and authoritarianism that has proven increasingly illusory. Recurring themes include the alliance of science and efficiency in the neoliberal era, the continued role of science and technology in the exercise of state power, and challenges to the authority of scientists and engineers arising from both ends of the political spectrum.

Philosophy of Science

What Is Science?

Tim Lewens (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

Is science better than other forms of knowledge? Even if it is not better, is it in any way distinctive? This course covers key attempts to demonstrate and to uphold such distinctiveness. We start with classic 20th century attempts to identify the scientific method. Karl Popper, for example, argued that a genuine attempt to falsify one's own theories was the hallmark of the critical attitude essential to science. This view has been challenged by Thomas Kuhn who regarded a dogmatic adherence to a paradigm as the hallmark of 'normal' science, and by philosophers like Nancy Cartwright who denies the possibility of codifying science into a set of rules. Social approaches to scientific knowledge instead characterise science by a set of norms this community follows. We consider recent attempts by scientists to overcome the replication crisis by instituting norms of open science. Finally, this course considers pluralist alternatives to characterising a scientific method.

Introductory reading:

Is Social Science an Oxymoron?

Anna Alexandrova (4 lectures, Lent Term)

Social sciences today are both enormously powerful and enormously insecure. They are frequently called to make predictions and to evaluate policies, while at the same time facing deep scepticism about the expertise they represent. In this course we examine the long standing view that social sciences are distinct from natural sciences both because of the nature of its objects and because of the methodology appropriate to study these objects. Can there be a science of human societies? Do social sciences have laws? If not, can they still offer respectable explanations? Or perhaps we can only hope for post‐hoc narratives that provide understanding without being able to predict or explain causally. If social sciences are special, it may also be due to their association with social and political movements. We conclude the course with examining reasons for and against value freedom.

Introductory reading:

Space, Time and Reality: The Philosophy of Physics

Matt Farr (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

Modern physics paints a picture of the world that differs radically from our everyday conceptions. This course introduces you to the philosophical foundations of physics and the two-way relationship between physics and philosophy. What does physics really imply about the nature of the world we live in? What kinds of things are space and time? Could we travel into the past? How can we have knowledge of unobservable entities ranging from superstrings to the structure of the universe itself? And should we really trust the ever-changing theories that science gives us? We will examine these questions and more through a series of case studies from the history of physics.

Introductory reading:

Philosophy of Biology

Tim Lewens (4 lectures, Lent Term)

Many prominent philosophers of biology have argued that the basic units of classification within biology need to be handled in a fundamentally different way to the basic units of classification in the physical and chemical sciences. Perhaps it is true, these philosophers say, that nothing can possibly be an instance of the chemical kind Gold unless it has the atomic number 79. But nothing along these lines can be said of biological species. It would be a mistake, they say, to think that what makes something an instance of the species Canis familiaris is the possession of some characteristic set of genes. They go further: not only does Canis familiaris have no essence, species are not even properly thought of as 'natural kinds'. Instead, they are 'individuals', and more specifically they are twigs on the tree of life. This course begins by explaining and evaluating this anti-essentialist consensus. It moves on to assess a surprising consequence claimed for anti-essentialism: it has been suggested that a proper understanding of species has the upshot that there is no respectable notion of human nature. The final two lectures of the course examine a series of positive proposals about what human nature is, and why it matters, that claim to be in harmony with the biological sciences.

Introductory reading:

Philosophy of Science in Practice

Stephen John (4 lectures, Lent)

In this lecture course we look at the complex inter-relationships between scientific research and social values. We start by considering different accounts of the proper aims of science, asking how these accounts relate to practical problems around science funding. We then go on to consider the process of research, focusing in particular on two topics: ethical restrictions on permissible research, and whether non-epistemic values are required to close the gap between data and theory. In the third part of the course, we consider the use of science in practical domains such as medicine and policy-making, asking which kinds of evidence count as good bases for decision-making. Finally, we consider the broader question of why and when the public should trust scientists, and whether and how scientific institutions can facilitate such trust.

Introductory reading:

Philosophy of Environmental and Climate Science

Ahmad Elabbar (4 lectures, Lent Term)

We are familiar with the idea that human activity can change environmental conditions, from air pollution in cities to plastic waste contamination in the oceans. But can we really detect environmental change and attribute to anthropogenic influence, especially when the potential causes of environmental change are vast? How much evidence should scientists gather before drawing conclusions? Is cost-benefit analysis appropriate in environmental science and policy, or should environmental risks be managed using the so-called precautionary principle? And for that matter, what do we even mean by 'environment' and 'climate'? In these lectures, we will examine such foundational questions that arise across disciplines that study changes to environmental conditions, triggered by anthropogenic activity. The first two lectures provide a broad background on environmental sciences, reflecting on the very idea of an 'environment', and explores the challenges of gathering robust evidence on environmental change. The next two lectures shift towards the use of science in environmental policy, focusing on debates about risk management and the ethics of decision making under uncertainty.

Introductory reading:

Minds and Machines

Tom McClelland (2 lectures, Easter Term)

Machines are routinely described using mental language: laptops ‘think’, LLMs ‘understand’ and drones make ‘decisions’. But are such descriptions apt? Can a computer really have a mind and, if so, what kind of mind might it have? Efforts to answer these questions scientifically face considerable methodological challenges. These lectures focus on two such challenges: how to test for artificial intelligence and how to test for artificial consciousness. To confront these challenges, we will explore difficult questions about the concepts of intelligence and consciousness. We will also examine the relationship between the mental and the biological and consider whether the human mind is itself a kind of computer. And we will investigate how various biases might skew our evaluation of artificial minds and reflect on the risk of AI ‘gaming’ our tests.

Philosophy of Medicine

Harriet Fagerberg (4 lectures, Easter Term)

Most of us would agree that some conditions are normal and healthy while others are diseased or disordered. For example, tuberculosis is a disease; pregnancy is not. Being profoundly heartbroken is not a mental disorder; depression is. But what exactly is it that makes a condition pathological as opposed to healthy? Can this distinction be made in biological terms or does it involve social norms and value judgements? We also classify medical disorders into categories such as syphilis, Crohn's disease and borderline personality disorder. These categories play an important role both in scientific research and in clinical practice. But what justifies categorising diseases in this way? This course will provide an introduction to topics in the philosophy of medicine. We'll first consider different accounts of the nature of health and disease, before applying these theories to mental illness. We'll then explore whether medical kinds should be thought of as natural kinds, and what the implications might be for classification in both medicine and psychiatry.