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Department of History and Philosophy of Science


The Cambridge Episteme Group is a collaboration across the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and the Faculty of Philosophy aiming to explore contemporary issues in analytic epistemology. The plan of the group is divided into two parts: in Michaelmas the reading group will explore new frames and tools of epistemology, aiming to move beyond typical framing in terms of truth, knowledge, and epistemic norms by exploring the limits of the doxastic, norms of inquiry, and consequentialist accounts of epistemic warrant. In Lent the group will apply these new frames to different topics, like non-propositional knowledge, thought-experiments, imagination, understanding, and so on. Overall, we want to equip philosophers interested in epistemology and philosophy of science with new tools for thinking about epistemic issues and inquiry.

We meet on Thursdays at 1pm in the Board Room, HPS. Organisers: Oscar Westerblad (ow259), Adham El-Shazly (ae497), Pablo Hubacher (ph539).

Lent Term 2023

26 January: Inquiry

Christopher Kelp (2021). 'Theory of Inquiry'

2 February: Against Inquiry Norms

David Thorstadt (2022). 'There are no Epistemic Norms of Inquiry'

9 February: Norms on Evidence Gathering

Flores, Carolina & Woodard, Elise (forthcoming). 'Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering'

16 February: Salience

Jessie Munton (2021). 'Prejudice as the Misattribution of Salience'

23 February: Understanding

Rachel Fraser (Manuscript). 'Understanding is Seeing'

2 March: Imagination

Mike Stuart (2022). 'Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination'

9 March: Epistemic Non-Consequentialism

Sylvan, Kurt L. (2020). 'An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism'

16 March: Self-deception

Jordan MacKenzie (2022). 'Self-Deception as a Moral Failure'