Department of History and Philosophy of Science

Paper 6
Metaphysics, Epistemology and the Sciences

Paper managers: Marion Godman and Hasok Chang

Michaelmas Term
Primary Source
Marion Godman
Wed 10am (weeks 1–4)
Christopher Clarke
Tue 12noon (weeks 1–4)
Laws of Nature: Between Regularities and Powers
Anna Alexandrova
Tue 12noon (weeks 5–8)
Learning and Discovery
Hasok Chang
Wed 10am (weeks 5–8)
Lent Term
Metaphysics of the Sciences: The Challenge from Biology
Marion Godman
Tue 10am (weeks 1–8)
Theory and Evidence
Marion Godman, Christopher Clarke
Thu 12noon (weeks 1–8)

This paper provides a canonical treatment of a series of traditional questions in the philosophy of science. The sorts of questions covered include whether we should believe that our best scientific theories are true, the issue of the general nature of scientific knowledge, the role of various forms of simplification and idealisation in science, the pretensions of science to reveal a mind-independent reality, and issues around the alleged unity of the sciences and of scientific method.

Primary source

The Stanford School
Marion Godman (4 seminars, Michaelmas Term)

Is there a unified method to science? And does this method reveal a unified reality? These are the questions that preoccupied philosophers of science from the so-called Stanford School. Their approach arose in the 1980s as a counterweight to the then conventional philosophy of science. As well as questioning methodological and metaphysical unity of science, the Stanford School philosophers advocated a greater engagement with the details of scientific practice, its history and sociology. We will study three particularly influential papers that came out of Stanford School:

  • Ian Hacking, 'Do we see through a microscope?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 62 (1981), pp. 305–322; it is also reprinted essentially in the same form as chapter 11 of Hacking's Representing and Intervening
  • Nancy Cartwright, 'Fundamentalism versus the patchwork of laws', chapter 1 of The Dappled World: A Study in Boundaries of Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); previously published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:279–292 (1994)
  • John Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1993), chapter 10, 'The Disunity of Science', pp. 221–243


Christopher Clarke (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

What does it mean to explain something? Is there a particular meaning of 'explanation' when it takes place in science? The traditional theory of explanation in the philosophy of science has been the deductive-nomological (D-N) model. Reviewing the weaknesses of the D-N model, we explore some alternative philosophical theories of explanation, including the causal model, the pragmatic model of van Fraassen, and the unificatory model of Kitcher and Friedman.

Laws of Nature: Between Regularities and Powers
Anna Alexandrova (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

The discovery and confirmation of laws have long been considered the crowning glory of modern science, but specifying exactly what these laws are has proved a thorny task. In this course, we consider three sides of the contemporary debate. The first side claims that laws are few and not nearly as important as first thought and instead science is after more modest and less universal truths such as mechanisms. The second side disagrees and defines laws as stemming from fundamental causal powers inherent in objects. The third side also believes in laws, but defines them as mere summaries of events that do not govern the world. We will evaluate these options by considering both their metaphysical presuppositions and their ability to make sense of methodology of science, including practices such as modeling and explanation.

Learning and Discovery
Hasok Chang (4 lectures, Michaelmas Term)

Philosophers of science in recent years have tended to neglect the processes by which scientists acquire knowledge, focusing more on the justification of already-gained ideas and beliefs. In this course we investigate the processes through which scientific knowledge is learned, both from other people and from nature. Much of our attention will be focused on the development of knowledge in the absence of certain foundations, and on the tacit and metaphorical dimensions of learning. The main authors whose ideas will help us include Kuhn, Polanyi, Wittgenstein, Hesse, and Lakoff and Johnson.

Metaphysics of the Sciences: The Challenge from Biology
Marion Godman (8 lectures, Lent Term)

Can the world be carved at its joints? How are we to understand causal relations? Do all sciences aim to find natural laws? In this course we undertake a critical examination of these and other metaphysical issues, which appear to be informed by work in science. Attention will be focused on biological and biomedical sciences, and especially on the challenges they pose to views of the sciences inspired by a diet of examples taken from the physics. Topics covered will include natural kinds, essentialism, causation and laws of nature.

Theory and Evidence
Marion Godman, Christopher Clarke (8 lectures, Lent Term)

Whatever one might think of the scientific method, it would be difficult to deny that we do give more credence to a theory as it accumulates more positive evidence. But there are many complex questions. Measuring the degree of confirmation is not a trivial matter, as seen through the difficulties of the hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesianism. Some classic paradoxes show that what we mean by 'positive evidence' at all can be highly ambiguous. The theory-ladenness of observation creates a threat of circularity in the confirmation relation. The presence of auxiliary assumptions blunts the force of any confirmation or refutation that an observation may have on a theory. If there is incommensurability between competing paradigms, there is no fully shared basis of observations against which to judge theories. Considering such difficulties, what can we preserve in the notions of evidence and confirmation?

Preliminary reading

  • Alan F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science?, 4th ed. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2013); earlier editions are fine
  • Alan Musgrave, Science, Common Sense and Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
  • Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)
  • Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
  • Christopher Hitchcok (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004)
  • Alex Rosenberg and Daniel McShea, Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008)
  • Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
  • Martin Curd and J. A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (New York: Norton, 1998)
  • Psillos, Stathis and Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (London: Routledge, 2008)

Further resources are available on the HPS Part II CamTools site.